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A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TESTIMION Y1
CHARLES

STILLMAN

MORGAN2

In a previous article3 i acquainted the readers of this Journal
with a new method of arriving at a sense of the value of courtroom
testimony. In writing in the field of legal psychology, however, one
feels that it is the exceptional reader who is not cherishing a desire,
unexpressed perhaps, that the old order of things be let alone and
that this newest intruder be suppressed before it has accumulated the
momentum of a rapidly progressing science. To such honestly skeptical readers I hope to bring a sane statement of the place of psychology in legal practice that will enable them to establish more
rationally their attitude toward this willing handmaid of the active
lawyer. From an extremely enthusiastic believer in the unquestionable ability of legal' psychology to save the law from utter disgrace
in the eyes of the public I have gradually simmered down to a state
of mind which makes up in practicability and utility for what it has
lost in warmth. In this article, then, I propose to work out with the
reader's assistance a simple statement of what seems to be the proper
relation, so far as testimony is concerned, of legal psychology to legal
practices. To do this properly it will be necessary to trace swiftly
the various steps which preceded this simple statement of our conclusion. Any science proceeds from the complex to the simple and
the test of our work will be the degree.of simplicity which we attain
in stating our conclusion. Incidentally it will be possible to develop
a few collateral ideas that will solidify our treatment.
At the very outset it will be well to establish clearly a point which
is really the raison d'etre of this article. That point is this: the value
of a particular piece of testimony is not established or disproved by a
mere determination of the veracity of the witness. If the witness is
not veracious; i. e., if -be willfully tells as the truth what he knows
not to be' the truth, his testimony is obviously of zero value. An
academic writer, like myself, could scarcely expect to add anything
to the highly developed common sense methods of determining a
witness's veracity now and for ages in use. But equally important and
at times more important because more difficult to ascertain is the
determination of the ability of a given witness, proved honest and
1
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anxious to tell the truth, to tell the objective truth, to translate an
outward event into words for the auditor's use. The same set of facts
will be given one interpretation by A and another by B; to this extent
does the subjective overrule and condition the objective. In this
article attention is confined to this latter problem.
There has been a gradual accumulation of literature on the psychology of testimony, some the work of pure scientists, some the
work of novelists and journalists. 4 The great work in this field is
yet to be written, however. Writers upon this subject are or should
be largely inductive in their methods of research. The difficulty has
always been in collecting sufficient dependable data from which to
draw accurate conclusions. In working up this subject I have proceeded in two ways: in part I have used a large number (about one
hundred and fifty) of people as subjects for a simple test of the laws
of testimony; in part I have used about twenty subjects in a series
of more intensive tests. The evidence is, then, both extensive and
intensive.
In the extensive work the attempt was made to reproduce as far
as possible everyday conditions of receiving and setting forth observations. Simplicity wis paramount. In keeping with but in no sense
in imitation of the work of earlier writers I took a situation about like
this: by prearrangement with the lecturer I entered a university class
in psychology in a very matter-of-fact way and presented to the
lecturer a note. This he read and said: "I will be there at two o'clock."
After replying "thank you" I left as unostentatiously as I had entered.
A week later the professor in charge presented to these students a
set of questions which I had prepared; the one hundred and fifty
results were handed over to me for interpretation.
Here we have all the essentials of an evidential complex. Although
prearranged and minutely detailed before consummation, my entry into
this large lecture room appeared entirely casual. None of the students realized till later that they were being made use of as witnesses. The two or three who knew me were not allowed to influence
the results. The lapse of a week allowed the incident to assume a
still more insignificant place in their memories. Had the testimony
been extracted the next day or a month later the results would have
been vastly different. The great number of subjects used allowed the
establishment of certain laws of testimony; the presence of both sexes
4
1n particular I have made use of William Stern's "Lectures on the Psychology of Testimony and on the Study of Individuality," American journal of
Psychology, Vol. 21, pp. 270-282.
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contributed variety to the results. Every state of mind, from extreme
concentration to playful or restless inattention, was represented in
this class that morning. My careful guarding against doing anything
or wearing anything that would unduly attract the attention rendered
the results more significant for the purpose in hand.
There are two fairly distinct ways of reporting facts from memory; our present purpose is to discover the relative worth of these
two methods. One way is to allow the witness to tell his own story
from beginning to end without interruption-the narrative method
(German, Aussage). The other is to draw out his knowledge by
asking him pertinent questions. The former method is not commonly
used in courts of law to-day. In going through the scores-of, narrative
reports which these students were asked to make on the above simple
incident, nothing stands out in clearer relief than the similarity, the
mechanical character, of the workings of the human mind. In general
the testimony thus obtained sef forth the essential facts of the situation. There were errors, to b6 sure, important errors; on the other
hand certain reports indicated a fine grasp of the situation. Some
erred on the side of crudeness of statement;. others on the side of
finesse of statement. The typical report would have given any interested third party a picture of the situation that would have met his
chief requirements. This general statement of the character of the
results obtained by the use of the narrative method should establish
or reestablish our faith in this form of testimony, and at the same
time show us what degree of error can normally be expected under
such circumstances.
All the papers set forth those facts which were too obvious to
be neglected; but some went into detail to a surprisingly marked
degree. Girls were more apt to do this than boys as well as to mince
over the facts and add a touch from their imagination or related
experiences. Thus the girls quite commonly said I was embarrassed,
presuming to -bespeak my condition as of that time, while, the young
men saw no occasion for a similar remark.. Everywhere I was
struck by the positive character of the statement's made. There were
no "maybe's," no "probably's ;" I wore a red coat and a brown hat
when in fact the coat was black and the hat was a blue and white
toque. Rare indeed was the candid reporter. The old desire to tell
* a good, a complete story, was here seen cropping out. The lowlands
of their memories were filled up from the highlands of their imaginations. We all dislike to stop short of a rounded-out narrative; the
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desire, the temptation, to be complete adds a fringe of untruth to
nearly all of our everyday reports of facts. If our observations or
recall be incomplete we dare not jump the intervening gap in our
account; we bridge it, perhaps entirely unconsciously, with things
that might have been. Indeed, it seems altogether probable that far
too many witnesses are pressed to give forth evidence without being
properly equipped with the facts to be able to do so; it seems that
we err on the side of expecting too much rather than on the side
of expecting too little from those we have on the witness stand.
In conclusion, then, I should say that the percentage of error in
these narrative repogts was from twenty to twenty-five per cent.
This closely agrees with Stern's figure for similar experiments. This
result will be compared with that obtained from the interrogatory
method of eliciting testimony and our conclusion as to their relative
worth can then be drawn.
In the second or interrogatory method of eliciting testimony there
are really two persons testifying, the one who asks and the one who
answers. By this statement the idea should be conveyed that suggestion, as coming from the interrogator, may play as large a part in
the witness's mind as the objective facts with which he came to the
witness stand. As Stern says, suggestion is "the imitative assumption
of a mental attitude under the illusion of assuming it spontaneously."
This influence of suggestion is all the more to be guarded against
because of its insiduous character; it enters the witness's mind, does
its damage, and departs without leaving a trace of its existence apart
from the perverted testimony which it has adduced. Suggestion is
the great fact to be reckoned with in any discussion of the interrogatory method of obtaining testimony. Hence the second division of
this paper is devoted to a discussion of this matter.
With this in mind I framed certain of the questions asked on
the same set of facts as outlined above 'so as purposely to influence the
answers to them. I tried to introduce and to measure degrees of
suggestiveness. Thus the question, Do you think he was very tall?
How tall was he?, as asked, was more suggestive than the request
to state his height would have been. But to ask whether the suit
worn was black or brown when it was in fact gray, or to ask what
color of flower was worn when in fact none was worn at all, was
suggestion carried to a very far degree. Other questions were asked
in a way as free from suggestion as possible. Let us run through
some of these questions and answers hurriedly.
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The first question was as to the time of my entrance into the
room. The actual time was 11:45. 11% answered correctly; 8%
did not venture an answer; 5% set a time later than 11:45; 76%
underestimated the'time. While recognizing the peculiar character of
telling the time in a classroom, there is yet 'some reason for the
unexpected error on the side of putting the.time too early. just such
situations as this show how carefully all relevant circumstances must
be borne in mind in evaluating evidence. Any bit of testimony comes
out of an enveloping complex of circumstances.
The answers to the question, How long was he in the room?,
were likewise difficult to interpret. The actual time was one minute.
Answers varied from one, two and three seconds (invariably rendered
by girls) to ten minutes One is the more surprised at these answers
because of the ease with which one could estimate the-time it took
the incomer to do all that he did. The bulk of the answers varied
between one minute and three minutes and about thirty per cent
were accurate. There was probably no element of suggestion in this
question.
When asked the question, Do you think he was very tall? How
tall was he?, the.surprising answers four feet and six feet six inches
were received. Girls were very likely to underestimate my height,
suggesting to what extent people calculate height in terms of their
own stature. But the young men were not inclined to overestimate
my height, as the above statement might predispose one to expect.
About twenty-two per cent had the correct height and the bulk of the
answers varied but two inches from correctness. Presumably height
is better remembered than are colors, as we shall see presently. ,
The more suggestive question, Did he wear an overcoat? If you
think he did, describe the overcoat, trapped about thirty per cent of
the class, who said no overcoat was worn. A small per cent did not
know whether a coat was worn or not, while 67% tried to recall the
color of the coat. Stern says that colors are very poorly remembered
and such seems to have been the case in this instance. While 27%
of the 67% described the coat correctly, the rest gave answers in nine
different colors and styles. This showing gives clear indication that
their replies were not ,based on any real knowledge of the facts of
the case.
The very suggestive question, Was his suit black or brown?,
took a large portion of the class unawares. A few said it was neither,
admitted they had forgotten, or said they could not see it, but a large
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percentage went on record as thinking it was black or as thinking it was
brown. As a matter of fact the suit was neither color. The percentage of accuracy was very low at this point. The answers to this
question show how manifestly the witness's mind is in the interrogator's-hands for safe keeping.
The percentage of error in the answers to the question as to
how many books were carried was large. It looks very much as if
the witnesses based their answers on the probabilities of the case
without actually knowing anything for a certainty. If a student were
used to carrying one book he would put down one book; if two, two,
etc. As a matter of fact three books were carried. In a broad sense
witnesses are forever thus supplying facts, largely unconsciously, to
round out their knowledge. The answers to this question were largely
fortuitous.
Although no flower was worn eighteen per cent thought one was
worn and three per cent described its color. This question was too
suggestive and overshot its mark. But few were led astray by it.
It shows, however, the important point that suggestion must not be
overdone and that there is a natural limit to its functioning.
To the question, Did he appear embarrassed or nervous?, the
answers were as likely to be yes as no. This result shows how difficult it is to separate the subjective from the objective. Undoubtedly
every person who said I was embarrassed said so because he or she
would have been in a similar situation. This is interesting psychology
but very poor testimony. The young ladies' greater tendency to find
embarrassment is perhaps to be explained in this way.
Only 24% had enough courage to overcome the suggestive question, Why didn't he look at the class? This is all the more astonishing
in view of the fact that practically all of the reports put in the narrative form expressly stated that I did look into the faces of the
class. Here in very simple form is seen one of the worst effects of
the interrogatory method.
Practically every witness reproduced correctly the lecturer's remarks to me and one-half reproduced correctly my reply. However,
these two remarks represented the high lights of this memory concept, the climax of this little drama, and all ears were alert to catch
them. Curiosity prompted attention and as a result gave a very accurate
memory concept. This experience alone shows how important it is
to have some information as to the degree of attention shown when
the observation is taken, when the impression is made on the witness's mind.
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It will have been noted that the percentage of accuracy in these
statements drawn out by the interrogatory method varies from three
to ninety-five per cent with perhaps forty the average. When the
narrative method was used the corresponding figure for accuracy
(75-80%) was much larger. Theoretically, then, we can conclude
without formal argument that the narrative method is much the better
from the standpoint of accuracy. But the practitioner will say that
there is no assurance that all the necessary facts will be produced when
only the narrative method is used. This is a valid criticism. We have
seen that the most important facts were brought out by this method
but we saw also that much is left out that would have to be produced if the testimony is to be completely useful. From this accumulation of statements two propositions can be drawn. The first is
that for a. statement that would be generally accurate, that would
be consistent and constructed with a sense of sequence and perspective,
the narrative method is by far the better of the two. Perhaps at all
times a witness should be allowed to tell his whole story without
interruption before being cross-examined. -At any rate there should
be more credence placed in the narrative method and more use made
of it in courtrooms. Our second proposition is that only on points
which to the witness are not significant or are not sufficiently clear or'
which he purposely- avoids, should a thoroughgoing use of the ititerrogatory method be made, and then only under the very considerable
limitation that so far as possible "leading" or suggestive questions
shall not be allowed. It is for the opposing counsel to detect such
questions and to bring to the attention of the presiding judge the
inadvisability of allowing them to be introduced. These two propositions are set forth merely as the offerings of experimental science; no
one appreciates more than the writer the extent to which they would
need to be altered to be made useful in practice.
I have purposely abbreviated the discussion of the intensive work
done with the twenty students enrolled in a more advanced course in
psychology. The work was done with technical care and the detailed
findings are available. But after all the important results can be conveyed in brief fashion to the readers of this Journal. The .problem
attacked was this: to what extent can and must courts of law apply
psychological tests to arrive at the accuracy of a witness's- testimony.
For our purposes tests of veracity are omitted, as in the beginning we
purposely addressed ourselves only to the question of accuracy. Such
technical tests of veracity as the well known association-reaction time
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test, are in existence, but I seriously doubt whether there are any
objective or mechanical tests ever so intricately devised that will give
faithful results and that will dispense with the human equation, the
juggling of wits between the subject and his interpreter. If this is
the case these tests are no improvement upon the time-honored
methods now in use of letting men read other men's minds unassisted
by the apparatus of the scientist.
Our own problem, then, is to discover the extent to which accuracy inheres in the testimony of a veracious witness. Accuracy in
turn depends on a number of mental traits. If one adds to ready
observation a retentive memory he has two prime marks of a good
witness; if his powers of association are fertile and his imagination
not too rich he again has some of the attributes of a good witness.
And so on with the other traits and their respective opposites. It was
with such a notion in mind that I devised a lengthy series of tests
through which each of these twenty students was put.
The purpose of the tests wAs to gain an index of each subject's
mind. He was therefore looked at from many different angles, as it
were. Thus, to test his readiness of reaction he was asked to cross off a
designated letter in a page of printed type thrown together promiscuously. If he were accurate but slow in doing this he was of one type
of mind; if speedy but inaccurate he was of another type. The work
was done under pressure and the percentage of error was rendered
in terms of the time used. To gain some idea of his readiness of
association he was given a series of words and told to give in a.
designated interval their respective opposites, the wholes of which they
were a part, or a word commonly associated with them. Thus black
usually brought forth the response white; door, the response house;
and bread the response butter. This is all very simple, and purposely
so, but with the time element added a very definite notion of the
witness's mental processes could be gained. Or again, if it were the
imagination that needed attention, a series, of chance ink-blots was
placed before him and he was asked to find all the various objects he
could in them. The process was repeated for several other traits. It
is surprising and encouraging to note what valuable information one
can obtain through the use of such simple tests as these. No extensive
laboratory equipment was needed; a little ingenuity and technical precision were all that were required.
In this way trait was added to trait for each individual and then
so far as possible a coefficient of correlation was worked out for him.
Either the Pearson or the Thorndike formula is available. Were such
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mathematical accuracy in working up the results not necessary one could
gain a fairly good idea of each witness's mental processes by merely
looking over the unrelated results of each separate experiment. When
this much has been done we have resulting a simple statement of A
or B's mental processes that cannot fail to be of some value were either
of these individuals to be used as a witness. The tests are reasonably
simple and easy to apply. Of what practical value they are we shall
see after turning aside for a minute to discuss another matter which
is closely related to the topic under discussion; viz., individual differences and criminal responsibility.
This problem is a large human one; our mention of it here is
only indicative of a larger demand for recognition of it. It is now a
rather commonplace remark to say that it is the nature of the criminal
and, not the nature of the "crime which is: the proper unit of legal
processes. A and B are both murderers and are sentenced to death
after it has been shown that there are no ameliorating circumstances
in either case. The law says that deatb by hanging is the penalty for
murder in this degree. But who of us is so callous and so shallow
as to say that A and B are so alike that exactly similar punishment
must be meted out to both? How different may have been the past
histories of these two men and how different the circumstances connected with their crimes. But yet the law knows only one kind of
death and both are made to experience it. The law is eminently
practical and abounds in exigencies. Having been shown that A and
B are both murderers in the first degree it jumps a vast number of
embarrassing individual differences and places both A and B on the
gallows. To be sure there is a changing attitude toward the criminal
showing itself of late years. The indeterminate sentence, the parole
system, houses of correction and reform schools of the better type,
and juvenile court all indicate that we feel that behind every crime
there is a personality and that both punishment and improvement are
to he reconciled with this personality.
The practicing lawyer will feel, at this point, that he is slipping
off of firm ground just as soon as he departs from an objective treatment of the criminal based on the relatively simple classification of
crimes. It is all too true that there are immensely greater difficulties
in classifying human types than in classifying men's actions, in classifying criminals as criminals by occasion, by passion, by habit, etc., than
in classifying them' as 'robbers, counterfeiters, murderers, etc.
Ideally speaking, society has no right to point an accusing finger
at any man without knowing all the facts of his life which bear upon
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his wrongdoing. Indeed, something should be known of his ancestry.
Biology has of late years afforded us some very interesting and useful
information as to the way in which some perverted ancestry, several
generations removed, reaches down and despoils a living being. Science
has largely annulled Lombroso's criminal type, but yet a lay observer
realizes that some individuals from birth are destined to be social
misfits. Legal practice is slowly beginning to see the point in all this
and probably is doing all that can be asked of it in simply recognizing
this sort of evil fatalism which bears so heavily upon some members
of society. In fact it seems after all that we should lose in hopeless
bewilderment all that we should gain in humanization by throwing the
attention entirely to the personality side of the crime. As practical
men lawyers cannot be asked to be psychologists, pathologists, or
sociologists. Occasionally when the crime is one of sufficient importance it may be necessary to call in the expert. Quite commonly
doctors and penologists and others are called in in difficult cases.
But in the great majority of cases it is asking enough if both judge
and lawyer are at least converted to our "psychological point of view."
In resuming this discussion we shall be answering the problem wifh
which we began this section of this study as well as be finishing the
entire essay.
We need to recognize that there are very positive differences in
the structure and workings of human minds. Otir brief account of
the more intensive tests, just given, has prepared us for this statement. Memory, imagination,, loquaciousness, gullibility, powers of
association and observation, all show important differences in individuals of apparently the same mentality. To be sure we spurn the
testimony of a person notoriously feeble of intellect. But we do not
seem to appreciate fully enough how strangely human minds are
blends; how there is an eternal law of compensation which is likely to
make the memory weak if the apprehension is ready, or which makes
good reasoning power go hand in hand with fluent powers of association. After all we shall have to admit that it would be well if we
could look into each witness's mind and into his past, for it is only
as we sympathize and appreciate him that we can pass judgment on
him with a decent accuracy. The tests as described above are at
hand and ready for use. With the aid of Whipple's or Starch's
manual a long series can be worked up in little time. With the use
of the correlation formula comparable trait can be combined with
comparable trait, until with mathematical calculations a single set of
numbers can be produced that will represent this man's mental pro-
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cesses. Sufficient has already been said as to these tests to allow us
to pass now to a brief presentation of our conclusions. They will be
twofold.
The first contribution to be spoken of is the answer to the question previously proposed: what is the assistance that psychology can
render to law ?-or what is the proper relation of these two fields? I
am much more convinced than ever that the significant contribution
will be that of a point of view. If somehow the idea becomes real to
the practicing lawyer that there is a science of the mind, that human
minds are a complex of varying traits, that there are laws of the
human mind but that these must be differently stated for every single
individual, a great advance toward a better state of things will have
been made. If he can be made to admit, and the more unconsciously
the better, that he must come and reason with this science and reckon
with these laws, a great battle will have been won. Happily, things
point toward a realization of our desire in this respect.
Our second and last point is concerned with how this change of
attitude can be facilitated. An enthusiast could convert the most cons&rvative of men by showing them a few of the most striking facts
which psychology has to offer. The curve of forgetting, the localization of the senses in distinct areas of the cerebrum, various illusions,
as of visual perception, would be very persuasive, especially if related
to actual cases which have come to their attention. There is need for
a popular account, replete with concr*ete cases, aiming to win over the
practitioner to whom it is addressed to new ways of thinking. If he
can be shown how very little, after all, can be brought into the range
of attention and how faulty it is to allow this or that witness to talk
authoritatively on a vast number of assumed observations, he will
perhaps feel the embarrassment 'born of a guilty conscience and
mend his ways. To facilitate matters all law sch6ols should give
some training in normal and abnormal psychology. To date there has
been little or nothing of this kind done.
Let us be sane on this, subject; let us be skeptical but yet not
scornful toward this new science; let us take what it has to offer us
in the way of a new point of view with open minds. Its contribution
is a very real one and cannot be neglected in justice to itself and
to the law.

